Papers and handouts on the patentability of computer implemented inventions.
The notes below set out our thinking on the patentability threshold for computer implemented inventions and on how European practice has developed. They are published as a summary of the subject matter only, and should not be acted on without first seeking professional advice.
Available notes
- The patentability threshold for computer implemented inventions, handout, April 2013
- Alice through the EP looking glass, December 2014
- Practice note
For the current position following the Supreme Court decision in Emotional Perception AI, see our latest news and our artificial intelligence practice page.
Full text of the practice notes
The transcriptions below are taken from the source PDFs, paginated to match the original documents.
The Patentability Threshold for Computer Implemented Inventions (April 2013)
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PRACTICE NOTE
The Patentability Threshold for Computer Implemented Inventions & Business Methods
Introduction
Recent Board of Appeal (“BoA”) decisions in T1769/10-IGT & T1051/07-SK Telecom appear to be different to earlier EPO case law on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions (“CIIs”) and other “mixed” inventions containing interacting technical and non-technical features. Mixed inventions can cover business methods, gaming systems as well as software based applications.
The underlying issue is that the meaning of “technical contribution” or “technical effect” is undefined in the European Patent Convention (“EPC”). The lack of clear guidance means that claims are rejected for apparently encompassing statutory excluded subject-matter, especially when “non-technical” features form a dominating part of a claim.
The Problem… and its Solution
The problem-solution approach is not the only way for assessing inventive step before the EPO, but it is the de facto standard. Unfortunately, there are also fields of technology where even the modified problem-solution approach (i.e. the formulation of a problem as an ‘aim to be achieved in a non-technical field’ (T0154/04-Duns Licensing) encounters difficulties. For example, the assessment of inventive step is very difficult, if not inappropriate, where at least part of the originality involves appreciating the existence of a problem or the opportunity for an unexpected improvement.
When examining a claim to a computer-implemented invention (CII), EPO examiners often isolate claim features from consideration simply because some features appear to be non-technical. This means that impermissible subjectivity is applied because the overall real-world effect is viewed out of context. Subjectivity (based on hindsight) can be seen, for example, when EPO examiners identify differences over the prior art and then to exclude “non-technical” features from consideration by suggesting that they cannot contribute to an overall technical effect. The issue of subjectivity is not helped by older European case law, especially the frequently referenced T641/00-Comvik decision. Unfortunately, Comvik is interpreted by different people in different ways and provides no clear guidance because it never deals with the issue of what is or isn’t technical.
European (if not national) patent law only precludes patentable invention when the excluded subject- matter is “alone”, so the question is really ‘what qualifies as excluded subject-matter and when does something take on a technical significance?’ To answer this question it is necessary to take a step back by asking a more fundamental question, namely: ‘what is actually taking place and/or what in practical reality is being achieved by the claimed “mixed” invention’?
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Our extensive work with the Examining Division and the Boards of Appeal indicates that the smallest technical advantage, achieved in practical reality and pointed out in the specification, inherently establishes technical contribution and overcomes the base question of excluded or patentable subject- matter. Also, to overcome this subjectivity and to help secure grant, it is critical that the description and the claim both point to what (technically) is being achieved in the real world.
A Change in Approach: T1769/10-IGT
In T1769/10-IGT, the BoA recognized the inherent difficulties in using the problem-solution approach when assessing mixed inventions: “In the problem-solution approach, the objective technical problem to be solved is formulated based on the technical effect caused by the distinguishing features of the claim over the prior art, and thus depends on the individual case…
In the case where some general form of implementation of the aim to be achieved in the non- technical field is already known from the prior art, the objective technical problem to be solved may be formulated more specifically as how to implement technically the aim in the non-technical field, or, reworded, to provide a technical solution involving technical means how to achieve the aim in the non-technical field” [emphasis added].
There is both good and the bad in this statement because the EPO is apparently saying that it is just a question of “how” you go about doing something. The question of what is being achieved by the claimed subject-matter is largely ignored. The question of what is being achieved is, in our considered view, more significant to the longer-term consolidation of international patent law and the patentability of CIIs.
Placing our commentary in content, the objective problem in the earlier T1051/07-SK Telecom decision was: “to provide the system with means allowing a user to load money on his account in the host computer (or to realise money from his account)”. The objective problem did not consider ‘what’ in practical reality the invention was protecting, although it is evident that the effect in the real world is a computerised banking system that provides access to funds, i.e. a computer-implemented business method that moves and releases funds to a client! The recited ‘technical’ parts in the allowed T1051/07- SK Telecom claim support loading of a mobile financial account through a cell phone and very little else. In fact, it seems reasonable to say that the “how” approach just corresponds to the technical implementation of excluded subject-matter as such. From our perspective, this doesn’t seem to be the right approach to the fundamental question of what is a patentable invention!
To explain in a little more detail, the “transaction system for providing a financial transaction service to a subscriber” in T1051/07-SK Telecom becomes less important than the way in which the system or method is achieved. But if the what is being achieved is not important, then we are left with the situation where any technical implementation is patentable even though the effect of the claim is directed towards a practical realization of excluded subject-matter, i.e. the claim is merely a dressed-up version of an underlying business method or the computerized implementation of a mental act or business process [see T0038/86, Headnotes 3 and 4]. Expressing this differently, “administrative and commercial aspects and rules of games” seemingly are ancillary and can generally be ignored when considering inventive step under Art.56 EPC provided that the claim is otherwise based on some form of machine or transformation of data in the real world. This suggests that the threshold for excluded subject-matter in
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the EPO is lower than the threshold tests applied by many first instance examiners, otherwise there is a double standard within the EPO case law.
Resolution and Opinion
From our perspective, the reasoning presented in T1769/10-IGT appears to be too liberal, although it reflects the fact that the EPO’s current regime of assessing CIIs is too harsh. The approach that we have developed and the specific questions that we’ve asked of the EPO’s Board of Appeal in successful appeal work suggest that our assessment has a high degree of credibility. We look forward to working with clients who wish to obtain grant of patents in this difficult area of computer, gaming and business method patent law where we have leading expertise.
At this time, filing of computer-implemented technologies, including business methods and gaming systems, is sensible given that the time frame to resolution is likely to be 4-5 years. We feel that it is only a matter of time before the issue of “technical contribution” is finally addressed, with this meaning that there will be a better objective test that makes patentability of CIIs generally easier.
*****
Notice: This practice note reflects the current opinion of Hepworth Browne and is distributed to selected associates and friends with a view to outline opportunities and to promote or highlight effective prosecution regimes before the EPO. The views expressed herein may change with time and should not be considered as legally binding. Should specific questions or issues arise, Hepworth Browne recommends that, prior to the undertaking of any course of legal action whatsoever, specific professional advice be obtained by the reader from a competent and qualified advisor. In this latter respect, Hepworth Browne remains at the reader’s assistance. For specific questions and further information, please refer to any query to Bruce C. Dearling (Partner) at bcd@hepworthbrowne.com or Robin Browne (Partner) at rfb@hepworthbrowne.com.
Hepworth Browne – Different by Design
© Hepworth Browne 2013
Alice Through the EP Looking Glass (December 2014)
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PRACTICE NOTE
ALICE (CORP) THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS:
A European Perspective
1.0 Introduction
1.1 For more than twenty years the European Patent Office – and indeed the English Courts especially following the highly criticized Aerotel decision – have adopted a noticeably stricter approach to what is, and more critically what is not, patent eligible in the field of computer- implemented inventions (CIIs), programs for computers and business methods. In contrast, the USPTO has been more dynamic, liberal and pro-patentee in allowing (initially) the grant of patents for process-based inventions that produce “a useful, concrete, and tangible result” (see State Street Bank vs Signature Finance). Subsequently this was changed to satisfy the machine- or-transformation approach advanced in Gottschalk vs Benson and later moderated by the Supreme Court in Bilski vs Kappos4.
1.2 Without doubt, the US and European patent systems are not yet quite in step. Recent decisions from the Boards of Appeal (T1769/10-IGT) and a succession of US Supreme Court cases – most recently Alice Corp vs CLS Bank – suggest that convergence is on the way on the issue of patentability of both CIIs and “schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business.”
1.3 This practice notes sets out some considered observations on the similarities and differences between cases, and presents a considered view on the technical threshold required for a claim to pass from being unallowable for reasons of statutory exclusion to the point at which an objective assessment of patentability must be made of the claim relative to the prior art. This commentary draws on the extensive prosecution experience of the author before both the first instance Examining Divisions and the Boards of Appeal of the EPO.
2.0 Issues Surrounding Convergence to a Sensible Common Position
2.1 Before getting into the detail, it is worth summarizing some of the problems that practitioners have recognized within the system as a whole:
2.1.1 A common approach is not helped by the fact that the language of the respective national/regional legislation remains different, although the intent of the language is arguably – in view of TRIPS7 – meant to have a similar legal effect. For example, 8 Art.52(3) EPC expressly delimits ‘non-inventions’- defined in Art.52(2)EPC – only to the extent that they seek protection for excluded subject-matter or activities “as such”.
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2.1.1.1 In the USA, 35 U.S.C. §1019defines patentable invention positively, whilst the jurisprudence has excluded “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from patentability.
2.1.1.2 Art.52(2)EPC says: “The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1: (a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers;
(d) presentations of information.
2.1.2 Many “leading” cases on both sides of the Atlantic are poor jurisprudence since they (i) seem to muddle the fundamental issues and (ii) are frequently directed to subject-matter that could have been rejected more effectively under obviousness standards, rather than as excluded subject-matter objections. Indeed, the arguments presented frequently appear to ask the wrong question(s) or propagate a fundamentally compromised approach to the objective assessment of patentability.
2.1.3 There has been a noted reluctance from any of the major tribunals to take a lead in setting a standard threshold of patentability for CIIs and business methods.
2.1.4 Some of the “leading” decisions have apparently:
(a) Side-stepped the real underlying issues about the threshold for patentability and what amounts to a “technical contribution” as reflected by the ‘non-opinion’ of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO in G03/08 and the Justice Kennedy’s Opinion of the Court in Bilski, section B2, final paragraph: “… the patent law faces a great challenge in striking the balance between protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that others would discover by independent, creative application of general principles. Nothing in this opinion should be read to take a position on where the balance ought to be struck”; and/or
(b) Lacked clarity with the result that patent office examiners have not understood the guidance from the courts and, consequently, have applied an overly zealous approach to the patentability of CIIs and business methods. Grant rates from one of the EPO Examining Divisions responsible for CIIs and gaming applications has historically been around 3%, while grant rates from the USPTO on business methods have plummeted following the decision Alice Corp vs CLS Bank.
2.1.5 The observed hysteresis around the threshold for patentability manifestly provides no certainty for business, erodes confidence and compromises innovation. “Mad Hatter: “Why is a raven like a writing desk?” “Have you guessed the riddle yet?” the Hatter said, turning to Alice again. “No, I give it up,” Alice replied: “What’s the answer?” “I haven’t the slightest idea,” said the Hatter”
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SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH
3.0 Scientific Theories and Mathematical Methods
3.1 The EPC expressly excludes “discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods” from patentability to the extent that the invention relates to this subject-matter “as such.” Consequently, it’s not possible to obtain patent protection for, say, Newton’s Law of Gravitation, Game Theory or a Fourier transform. However, this does not preclude patentability of a machine that:
i) makes use of gravity in its operation, e.g. an exercise work station employing variable weights,
ii) has complex signalling interactions based on specific inputs, e.g. such as in T533/0911 where patentability was established for a specific modulation of a train of defibrillation pulses separated by pauses, or
iii) applies a mathematical method in a signal processing mechanism to bring about an enhanced image (as in T208/84-Vicom).
3.2 The common thread is that there is a “practical application” of an excluded principle that brings about a positive real-world [technical] effect.
3.3 Correspondingly, the exclusions under US jurisprudence prohibit protection of “laws of nature, [and] natural phenomena”. These terms are logically understood and it is reasonable to conclude that their use and intent aligns with the similar terms in Art.52(2)(a) EPC. For the time being, it is necessary to put aside the issue of what amounts to “an abstract idea”, but we will return to this later.
3.4 In the non-opinion of G03/08, the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO positively indicated that the so-called “contribution approach” was an inappropriate mechanism for objective assessment of a patentable invention. The contribution approach assesses features on an individual basis with respect to the contribution that each feature makes having regard to the prior art. The contribution approach therefore would view a cup having a surface printed logo as non-patent eligible given that cups are known and that the printed image was expressly excluded for reasons of being an aesthetic creation or the presentation of information. The right approach, as reflected in T1173/97-IBM, is to say that the cup and image in combination are indeed technical and thus fundamentally patent eligible, but the printed logo contributes insufficiently to the overall technical function performed by the cup. Consequently, the claim – in essence the cup with its applied logo – can be rejected for having no technical synergy over the prior art and thus be dismissed for lack of an inventive step.
3.5 The threshold for excluded subject-matter is therefore not high; but it is a separate test (T0154/04-Duns Licensing, section 5D). It is necessary to consider only the totality of what is being claimed and then to consider whether the “what” is expressly excluded from patentability, e.g. is it a cup (which is technical subject-matter) or is it the presentation of information (which is excluded)?
3.6 Once you get over the threshold test and fundamental exclusions to patentability under the EPC “as such”, the substantive issues of patentability, i.e. novelty and inventive step, come into play.
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3.7 At this point, it is still necessary to consider the totality of the real world effect (as indicated in Mayo Collaborative Services vs Prometheus Laboratories, see Headnote 1) achieved by the interaction of each claim feature. The additional point here is that the EPO has recognized (see T0154/04-Duns Licensing) that a claim may legitimately have a mix of technical and non-technical features. These non-technical features may actually form a dominating part of the claimed subject matter. However, non-technical features, to the extent that they do not interact with the technical subject-matter for solving a technical problem, i.e. non-technical features “as such”, do not provide a technical contribution to the prior art and should therefore be ignored when… assessing novelty and inventive step. Unfortunately, with inventive step/obviousness considerations, it is too easy for an Examiner ‘to throw too many things out of the basket’ so care needs to be exercised in understanding how seemingly “non- technical” claim features actually impact on the effect achieved by the invention in the real world. One should step back and ask the more fundamental question of whether the invention covers statutory-excluded subject-matter, and only then move on to the objective assessment of novelty and inventive step. 3.8 Mayo Collaborative Services vs Prometheus Laboratories confirmed that, after the initial enquiry into whether the claim at issue is directed to patent-ineligible subject-matter, the claim elements should be considered both individually – this is dangerous and arguably misplaced in that isolation of features encourages subjectivity and prejudice – and then “as an ordered combination” to see whether the claim is transformed. Consideration of the entire interaction and resulting effect, i.e. the ordered combination, is therefore important, as it is before the EPO. In fact, consideration of the patent claim “must be considered as a whole” following Chatfield, 545 F. 2d 152, 158 (CCPA 1976).
3.9 The two-step framework in Mayo therefore needs to be treated with care since the two steps are distinct and entirely independent. One is a high-level threshold test for assessing general suitability of the invention for patent eligibility, and the other a detailed investigation about the contribution of the invention for reasons of objective assessment of inventive step/non-obviousness. Examiners should be reminded that the result from the first enquiry should not influence the independent enquiry about secondary technical contribution that leads to transformation of the claim. This aspect of Mayo should therefore reflect the headline approach in T0154/04-Duns Licensing, and once passed permits the invention to be assessed objectively in terms of its technical contribution under the substantive heading of obviousness or inventive step. In summary of the problem, the perception is that Examiners tend to incorrectly mix these two separate tests together. 3.10 An EPO Board of Appeal has recently decided in T1539/09 that a programming language was non-inventive since the additional steps were not technical. The subject-matter related to a graphical programming language and environment that enabled a user to produce program code without requiring major learning effort or programming expertise. It is noted that the case was not rejected for reasons of excluded subject-matter – as one might have expected – but rather under substantive issues of obviousness. The finding was that the new claim features were merely a mental process comparable to the verbalization of a thought or the formulation of a mathematical fact in calculus, with the totality of the claim (although technical) therefore being non-inventive. The threshold for overcoming an initial patent ineligible objection, i.e. the “as such” get-out-of-jail card in Europe, is therefore low.
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3.11 T1539/09 therefore highlights how exclusions under Art.52(2) EPC are perhaps dissimilar to the notion of an “abstract idea” under US practice. That said, it seems evident that the outcome of the case would have been the same regardless of whether the claimed subject- matter was considered as a fundamental building block or otherwise as either having no secondary technical contribution or merely the presentation of information “as such”.
4.0 “Abstract Ideas”
“If there’s no meaning in it,” said the King, “that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn’t try to find any. Let the jury consider their verdict.”
4.1 In Gottschalk vs Benson, there are some useful summary pointers and statements on the subject of patent eligibility. The case established that ‘[a]n idea of itself is not patentable’, following Mackay Co. vs Radio Corp” [w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematic expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of the scientific truth may be”. Firstly, this fits closely with the EPO’s position in, for example, T471/05 where a method claim merely formulated a series of mathematical and optical abstract concepts without properly requiring a physical, technical implementation. Protection of a mere ‘design’ that encompasses a purely abstract and conceptual implementation therefore is either a “mental act” or a “mathematical method” “as such”.
4.2 The protection of such broad ideas or concepts – that have no concrete technical base – will therefore continue to fail on both sides of the Atlantic.
4.3 In the EPO, for computer implemented invention (CIIs) and business methods, we are not faced with having to argue whether or not the concept is “an abstract idea”, but rather whether there is a “secondary technical effect” and whether the invention possesses the required technical contribution for patentability. In this regard, the Board of Appeal in T1543/06 Gameaccount21 found no identifiable synergistic effect between the game rules and technical implementation. The Board was unable to identify any effects other than those inherent in the game rules themselves or those connected to carrying out functions by a computer (with a processor and display). This decision confirmed that the mere technical implementation of excluded subject matter as such cannot form the basis of inventive step. In other words it is necessary to ask how the subject matter (e.g. a game or business method) in totality is implemented. Additionally, any consideration of the particular manner of implementation must focus on any further technical advantages or effects associated with the specific features of implementation over and above the effects and advantages inherent in the excluded subject- matter. T1543/06-Gameaccount therefore also confirms the decision in T258/03-Hitachi. In Hitachi, the non-patentable invention related to the automation of the non-technical activity of performing a “Dutch” auction in the absence of bidders, whereby a server (implementing the method) applied a business scheme (amounting to rules of an auction) and performed any necessary calculations. The Hitachi decision provided a definition of what amounts to an “invention” under Art.52(1)EPC, i.e. “subject matter having technical character” that can be inferred from the physical features of an entity or the nature of an activity or could be conferred on a non-technical activity by the use of technical means. T258/03-Hitachi confirmed that an invention which as a whole falls outside the exclusion zone of Art.52(2) EPC (i.e. is technical
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in character) cannot rely on excluded subject matter alone, even if that non-technical matter is novel and non-obvious. The Board stated that “method steps consisting of modifications to a business scheme and which are aimed at circumventing a technical problem rather than solving it by technical means cannot contribute to the technical character of the subject matter.”
4.4 Returning to Mayo vs Prometheus as reflected in Alice Corp, the US Supreme Court was similarly not prepared to permit a simple generic computerised implementation of a well- known method, nor would it allow a patentable invention to come about simply because of a 23 limitation to a particular technological environment. As stated in MPEP §2106, insignificant “extra-solution” components or insignificant post-solution activity will also not help render a claim patent eligible since the extra-solution component or method activity will not be considered as central to the purpose of the alleged (non-patent eligible) innovation.
4.5 Rather, the common position between US Supreme Court and current EPO practice, such as in T1543/06-Gameaccount, is that an appropriate technical implementation must bring about some form of synergistic technical effect that is more than just the change of binary zeros to binary ones in a processor. There needs to be an application of such concepts “to a new and useful end.” In other words there is a practical real world effect achieved by the claims. Mayo vs Prometheus says: “Considered “as an ordered combination,” these computer components “ad[d] nothing… that is not already present when the steps are considered separately.” Id., at ___. Viewed as a whole, these method claims simply recite the concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer. They do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself or effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. An instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer is not “enough” to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id., at ___. Pp. 14-16″
5.0 Building Blocks
5.1 In Parker vs Flook24, the US Supreme Court reiterated that “phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work”. 5.2 In Funk Bros. Seeds Co. vs Kalo Co., the US position seemingly differs immaterially: “He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be an invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end”.
5.3 In considering the decision in State Street Bank vs Signature Finance, the US Court of Appeals was arguably on the right track, but failed to go far enough to explain adequately what was meant to be covered by the statutory exclusions under the US statute. The Court of Appeals indicated that certain types of mathematical subject-matter, standing alone, represented nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical application, i.e. “a useful, concrete and tangible result”.
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5.4 The developing case law in the USA now appears to point strongly towards the requirement for some form of secondary technical effect to justify patentability, and that this is the over-reaching requirement.
5.5 Additionally, the Alice Corp decision now touches on two independent arguments that are being used successfully before the EPO and explains why certain applications fail.
5.6 First, from arguments initially presented in Bilski, organizing human activity in a business sense has some analogies to the treatment of a human-being by surgery or therapy. Protection for surgical therapies is unpalatable from ethical and moral perspectives. Correspondingly, attempting to secure patent rights to a process that seeks to exercise direct control over a human’s behaviour when no choice is available to the human will likely always fail, since this form of control amounts to use of a fundamental building block. In this respect, Alice Corp notably references a statement from Bilski: “Although hedging is a longstanding commercial practice, id., at 599, it is a method of organizing human activity, not a “truth” about the natural world ” ‘that has always existed,’…”
5.7 In fact, it is noted that the rebuttal observation from the Petitioner’s attorney to Chief Justice Roberts in Bilski hits the issue square on: “Now, the government has gone farther than that and really wants to exclude methods of organizing human behaviour. I think that’s the way they describe it. That’s really the business method rejection in other words…”
5.8 Secondly, CIIs require something more than post-solution activity. The simple computerized implementation of a concept – an abstract idea – does not possess enough real world technical interaction. In this respect, Alice Corp says: “These cases demonstrate that the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’ ” is not enough for patent eligibility. Mayo, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 3). Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea ” ‘to a particular technological environment.’ ” Bilski, supra, at 610-611. Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a computer,” Mayo, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 16), that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the pre-emption concern that undergirds our §101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, see 717 F. 3d, at 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring), wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of “additional featur[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.” Mayo, 566 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8-9).
The fact that a computer “necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, realm,” Brief for Petitioner 39, is beside the point. There is no dispute that a computer is a tangible system (in §101 terms, a “machine”), or that many computer-implemented claims are formally addressed to patent-eligible subject matter. But if that were the end of the §101 inquiry, an applicant could claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer system
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configured to implement the relevant concept. Such a result would make the determination of patent eligibility “depend simply on the draftsman’s art,” Flook, supra, at 593, thereby eviscerating the rule that ” ‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable,’ ” Myriad, 569 U. S., at___ (slip op., at 11).”
5.9 The EPO has consistently stated that its preferred mechanism for assessing inventive step – determining obviousness – is the ‘problem-solution’ approach. However, while this approach is acknowledged as not being the only mechanism, it is the de facto standard. The objective of the problem-solution assessment is to identify the real world technical contribution, but for mixed inventions, such as CIIs and business methods, a straightforward formulation may give a subjective and inappropriate result. Consequently, in T1769/10-IGT, the EPO Board of Appeal recognized the inherent difficulties and produced a generic statement about the use of the problem-solution approach to assessing mixed inventions: “In the problem-solution approach, the objective technical problem to be solved is formulated based on the technical effect caused by the distinguishing features of the claim over the prior art, and thus depends on the individual case…
In the case where some general form of implementation of the aim to be achieved in the non-technical field is already known from the prior art, the objective technical problem to be solved may be formulated more specifically as how to implement technically the aim in the non-technical field, or, reworded, to provide a technical solution involving technical means how to achieve the aim in the non-technical field” [emphasis added].
5.10 Consequently, the issue of patentability of mixed inventions (especially CIIs and business methods) reduces to how to implement technically the aim in the non-technical field, or, reworded, to provide a technical solution involving technical means how to achieve the aim in the non-technical field.
5.11 This conclusion is supported by the EPO decision inT1051/07-SK Telecom26.
5.12 In fact, the nature of “how” an invention is implemented arose to a more limited sense in T1051/07-SK Telecom. The question of what was being achieved by the claimed subject- matter was largely ignored, with the objective problem posed as: “to provide the system with means allowing a user to load money on his account in the host computer (or to realise money from his account)”. The objective problem does not consider ‘what’ in practical reality the invention sought to protect because the claim was fundamentally a technical solution, although it is evident that the effect in the real world is a computerised banking system that provides access to funds, i.e. a computer-implemented business method that moves and releases funds to a client. The recited ‘technical’ means in the allowed claim supports implementation of the loading of a mobile financial account granted to a cell phone and very little else. However, this was patentable because the implemented solution involved technical interactions that enhanced the existing system in a way that brought about synergy in the real world.
5.13 Drawing all the case law together, the fundamental issues appear to be as follows.
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5.13.1 Claiming a broad business process concept of “what is achieved” or what is being undertaken is going to fail – see further commentary in sections 5.12.3 & 6.7 below.
5.13.2 A claimed invention (for CIIs, mathematical methods and natural phenomena, etc.) must always have a practical application in that the totality of the claim must be seen to bring about a tangible real world secondary technical effect that is more than just a change in computer logic states. This reflects the “new and useful end” in Diamond vs Diehr27 and Gottschalk vs. Benson (amongst others). In fact, Alice Corp eloquently summarises what is needed: “Accordingly, in applying the §101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that claim the ” ‘buildin[g] block[s]’ ” of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more, Mayo, 566 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20), thereby “transform[ing]” them into a patent-eligible invention, id., at ___ (slip op., at 3). The former “would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying” ideas, id., at ___ (slip op., at 4), and are therefore ineligible for patent protection. The latter pose no comparable risk of pre-emption, and therefore remain eligible for the monopoly granted under our patent laws.”
5.13.3 Claims that organize human activity or exercise unwavering or inevitable human control will fail because they are the building blocks of society. However, if there are
(i) options available, (ii) the particular solution is technically implemented and (iii) the solution is not the mere automation of an existing business principle, then you have a shot at patentability. In other words, a valid claim will not see ultimate control of human behaviour, but rather a technical implementation that supports a particular choice or requires further interpretation.
5.14 “Abstract ideas” do not seem to encompass the concept of choice, nor do they preclude the assembling of multiple but fundamental building blocks into an interactive arrangement that has a real-world contribution seen in some form of secondary technical effect.
5.15 That said, the headline test that needs to be passed to move the claim into substantive examination is low. The hurdle to overcome will be whether the invention is non-obvious and possesses an inventive step.
5.16 The Alice Corp application would have failed at the EPO for the reasons expressed in T1543/06-Gameaccount, namely that there was no synergistic technical effect and, moreover, the “invention” amounted to the mere automation of a well-known business process, i.e. the claims looked to protect a fundamental behavioural process that permitted no option or choice. In fact, even with a more liberal and pro-patentee position, the Alice Corp claims would have failed at the EPO at the point of objective consideration of inventive step under T641/00-Comvik applying T1769/10-IGT correctly.
“It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backwards,’ says the White Queen to Alice.”
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5.17 In the recent decision from 13 November 2014 in Lantana Ltd28 v The Comptroller General of Patents, Design and Trade Marks [2014] EWCA Civ 1463, the Court of Appeal considered patentability of a CII under the patentable exclusions identified in section 1(2) of the UK Patents Act 1977. The alleged invention related to a method of extracting and transferring data between two computers linked over the internet and wherein one made a request to the other for a file. The local computer contained a list of the documents stored on the other computer. The user of the local computer sent an email message to the remote computer. The remote computer automatically responded by sending a return message with the file attached. In essence, there was a database and a communication flow between two computers based on a request and return function. Lantana argued that the arrangement saved the need for continuous connection to the remote computer and reduced the risks of being hacked while connected or losing the connection.
5.18 In the UK, while there is no comprehensive test for identifying a technical contribution, the courts have established a number of “signposts” tests initially developed in AT&T Knowledge Ventures’ Application [2009] EWHC 343 (Pat) and then refined in HTC Europe Co. Ltd vs Apple Inc. [2013] EWCA Civ 451. These signposts firstly attempt to provide a quasi-codified approach to the assessment of CIIs. Secondly, they further attempt to align the approaches of the English Courts and those employed by Boards of Appeal of the EPO, especially in Vicom, Hitachi and Duns’ Licensing. However, these signposts are not easily reconcilable with the EPO’s later approaches in T1051/07-SK Telecom or T1769/10-IGT and are seemingly overly restrictive. In any event, the Hearing Officer and first instance judge both indicated that there was no identifiable effect outside of the computer program itself and that the signposts were not of help. Lantana failed because it had no relevant technical effect given that any increase in the reliability of the data retrieval process was due solely to the use of e-mail rather than any other communication method. Lantana also failed because there was no indication that either of the two computers or the network were intrinsically more reliable. On the issue of connectivity, the use of an intermittent connection simply circumvented the problems of maintaining a good continuous connection. In the limit, a person at one site could have referenced a data library entry, phoned a colleague at a different site and obtained the information related to the identified file verbally from his colleague. The Lantana invention was therefore excluded because the “how” it achieved the results was nothing significant over a conventional process and, arguably, the “what” it achieved merely the computer-based implementation of a business process.
5.19 Without doubt, there is a reluctance in senior judges of the English Court of Appeal to re-visit the Aerotel test. It is also noted that the English courts are bound by the concept of precedent. However, case law does evolve and can be influenced by external factors, particularly significant decisions from the EPO in which the case law in a particular subject area is considered “settled”.
5.20 Instead of considering inventive step in Lantana, the courts decided the application under section 1(2) of the UK Patents Act dismissing the case for embodying excluded subject- matter. The concern is that the right decision was reached but for the wrong reasons. Arriving at the correct result through different assessment processes does not, however, mean that the English Courts are aligned with the Boards of Appeal of the EPO or that the one or other of the approaches is correct.
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5.21 To demonstrate this point, the Lantana appeal says, at paragraph [52], that the appellant’s attorney: “…did not dispute Kitchin LJ’s observation in argument that the methodology of the EPO and the English court should produce the same result. The position may be that the EPO and the English court ask the same questions – is there a contribution and, is that contribution solely within the exclusion? – but in a different order. The decisions of the EPO, therefore, provide only limited assistance to this court in determining whether the process adopted by the judge in this jurisdiction was flawed.”
5.22 Furthermore, the appeal decision in Lantana – see paragraph [14] of the appeal – references the English High Court’s initial assessment, namely: “Being novel and inventive is not what takes a contribution outside the excluded area nor is it what makes an effect or contribution “technical”.” At this point, alarm bells should be ringing with respect to alignment with the approach of the Boards of Appeal in both T0154/04-Duns Licensing and T1769/10- IGT.
5.23 In G03/08, the Enlarged Board of Appeal provided a specific warning on the difficulties surrounding the assessment of what is and what is not ‘technical’. In fact, the Enlarged Board entirely side-stepped the issue by saying: “It is hoped that readers will accept these assertions without requiring a definition of exactly what falls within the boundaries of “technical”.” Returning now to the criticism of the English Court of Appeal by the Technical Board of Appeal in T0154/04 Duns Application, the Board said that, with respect to the distinct and independent nature of invention within the patentability requirements of Art.52(1) to (3) EPC, it would be a “legal fallacy” to mix up the layman’s ordinary understanding of invention as a novel and often also an inventive contribution to the known art with the concept of invention in the sense of Art.52 EPC. Indeed, “any reference to the prior art in the context of Art.52(2) and (3) EPC would lead to insurmountable difficulties”, with the “technical effect approach endorsed by Lord Justice Jacob in the Aerotel/Macrossan judgement rooted in the second ordinary meaning of the term invention… which is not consistent with “a good faith interpretation of the European Patent Convention.” In fact, “the technical effect approach (with the rider) applied in Aerotel/Macrossan is irreconcilable with the EPC for the further reason that it presupposes that novel and inventive purely excluded matter does not count as a ‘technical contribution'” [section 12, emphasis added]. The final clause of the Duns Licensing criticism appears to be the antithesis of the approach advanced in Lantana. In fact, the Lantana decision seemingly contradicts the EPO’s position directly and reflects the legal fallacy of Aerotel, notwithstanding the “practical reality” requirement from Symbian, is being propagated though Lantana (see paragraph [08]).
5.24 There is a further problem with Board of Appeal decisions in that different boards are not bound by precedent, with any conflicts between different Board of Appeal decisions resolved through a referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal. Any Enlarged Board of Appeal should, invariably, set a legal standard across all court instances in all contracting states of the EPC.
5.25 With there being no express definition for the word “technical”, the meaning is left open to some varying interpretations by different examiners. For example, in T641/00-Comvik – considered an important case – the Headnote 1 says: “An invention consisting of a mixture of technical and non-technical features and having technical character as a whole is to be assessed
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with respect to the requirement of inventive step by taking account of all those features which contribute to said technical character whereas features making no such contribution cannot support the presence of inventive step.” This statement requires very careful consideration. Technical character is an absolute requirement for an invention in the sense of the EPC, with this stated in T931/95-Controlling Pension Benefits System/PBS Partnership, but technical character is also undefined other than it relies on a circular definition and consideration of all those features which contribute to the technical character. What amounts to a meaningful ‘contribution’ as a whole is therefore a critical step in any objective assessment. The problem with Comvik is that it skirts around the issue and makes some fairly bland if not unclear statements that are open to interpretation or confuse the underlying message, e.g. “where a feature cannot be considered as contributing to the solution of any technical problem by providing a technical effect it has no significance for the purpose of assessing inventive step.” Furthermore, Comvik is now more than 10 years old and its approach to mixed inventions and the assessment of inventive step seemingly must be viewed in light of the newer and apparently accepted “how to implement technically the aim in the non-technical field…” instruction of T1769/10-IGT (although this was from a different Board)
5.26 The rejection of non-technical features within a claim balances on establishing whether a causal link can be established between interacting technical and non-technical features, which causal link then brings about an overall technical contribution when the claim is considered as a whole. It is, however, noted that in T27/97-Cryptographie à clés publiques/France Telecom32 the Board of Appeal, in assessing inventive step, ignored a feature distinguishing the claimed subject-matter from the prior art for lack of any established technical effect causally related to that feature.
5.27 The divergence of the English Court of Appeal’s approach relative to the Boards of Appeal should therefore not be underestimated since the current English approach seemingly unduly restricts the meaning of technical and what amounts to a technical contribution.
5.28 Finally, on the issue of CIIs and business methods, it is noted that the Australian Full Federal Court (FFC), in its long-awaited Research Affiliates appeal decision, has held that claims directed to a method and system for generating an index of assets (such as stocks) do not constitute patentable subject matter because they are directed to an “abstract idea”. The FFC said: “the method of the invention is not one that has any artificial or patentable effect other than the implementation of a scheme, which happens to use a computer to effect that implementation.” This decision therefore appears consistent with T258/93-Hitachi, Lantana and Alice Corp given that there is no underlying secondary contribution and the claim was merely the implementation of a business process in computer code.
6.0 Observations & Recommendations
“Where should I go?” – Alice. “That depends on where you want to end up.” – The Cheshire Cat.”
6.1 Does the test for inventive step – in contrast to the test for non-patent eligible subject- matter under Art.52(2) EPC and 25 U.S.C. §101 – in mixed inventions or CIIs reduce to “how” functional features are implemented? Is the “how” aspect over-riding and therefore irrespective of what the claimed invention in totality seeks to protect? We leave it to the reader to decide
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the relative importance of “what” the claim seeks to protect and “how” this is achieved, although we feel that these are distinct investigations.
6.2 In the short to mid-term, a problem remains with education of Patent Office examiners. Attorneys need to understand how specifications and arguments should be framed to prevent examiners from inappropriately generalizing either the precedent established by the Courts or the guidance provided by the Boards of Appeal. The correct approach should limit the ability of an examiner to advance inappropriate or facile arguments against patent ineligibility and inventive step that rely on hindsight or flawed subjective reasoning. The fact remains that “inventions that integrate the building blocks of human ingenuity into something more by applying the abstract idea in a meaningful way are eligible.” But there is no hard definition of an “abstract idea” and, equally, no definition of what is meant by “technical effect”. These subjective terms therefore mean different things to different people. The problems lie in identifying what amounts to just a “building block” and further identifying “when does a claim overcome the threshold test for inherent patentability, thereby permitting objective assessment of non-obviousness to commence?” The threshold to overcome the statutory exclusion was intended by the legislator to be low, and is low when approached correctly.
6.3 There is a significant distinction between the fundamental building blocks of commerce which will inherently be “abstract ideas” and the technical implementations of solutions that on their face appear to be directed towards abstract ideas. In the latter respect, if the overall subject- matter of the claim has a technical flavour, then the patentability issue should invariably reduce to the question of inventive step and particularly the technical contribution that the claimed invention (in its totality) makes to the real world. Once there is a general technical character, the substantive question is how the invention is implemented technically to bring about a discernible real-world technical effect.
6.4 The USPTO’s notice “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd v. CLS Bank International, et al”34 dated 25 June 2014 unfortunately prominently stated that “abstract ideas are excluded from eligibility based on a concern that monopolization of the base tools of scientific and technological work might impede innovation more than it would promote it”. This statement, however, is not the complete objective test. However it will now doubt be interpreted by the unwary to result in, at least initially, the unreasonable and potentially wholesale rejection of CII and business method cases through a belief that business methods are unpatentable.
6.5 Drafting of applications for business methods and CIIs alike therefore critically must include the following.
i) An explanation of the real world effects. Expressing commercial advantages in terms of corresponding technical effects is preferable. For example, rather than speak about protecting confidential information, the flip (technical) side might be to provide reduced signalling across the network to limit interception opportunities and reduce overall data traffic between specific components;
ii) Identification of interactions in terms of both real world cause and effect;
iii) Identification of specific functional and structural differences over prior art systems; and
iv) Statements about all forms of advantage associated with either the particular architecture(s) or each aspect of the signalling scheme and/or communication protocol.
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6.6 Object statements are generally undesirable since they invariable expose the clients’ feet to the flame when an Examiner suggests that a changed main claim no longer fulfils the stated objective; and therefore that unallowable new matter has been added to the initially filed disclosure. However, it is necessary to “sell” the “technical” aspect of the invention through a positive statement of acquired benefits and advantages. This can be done either in the summary of the invention or otherwise in the main body of the description. These statements can be de- limited through optional but preferable use of the word “may”. Failure to sell the real world technical effect for CIIs and business method inventions will likely prejudice prosecution of the application by allowing an examiner to take the easy way out. A facile rejection of the subject- matter is more difficult if the Applicant’s arguments constrain the discussion to the overall secondary technical effect achieved in the real world, as discussed above. It is noted again that, in considering the achieved technical effect, examiners have in the past demonstrated a desire to discard claim features that initially appear to relate directly to excluded subject-matter. However, with objectivity and a detailed contextual understanding of the entire claim, those same features may actually support a real world secondary effect.
6.7 In summary, non-inventions related to abstract ideas, discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical methods, aesthetic creations, presentations of information and programs for computers do not in isolation have a practical application. Consequently, claims that “as such” relate to these “building blocks” should not be patentable, whereas claims that actively and practically apply those building blocks to bring about a further ‘technical effect’ should always succeed. Non-inventions that can be categorized as relating to the “human behavioural principle” – i.e. inventions that relate to abstract ideas or schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business and which dictate precise and unwavering control of a human action without choice or option – should not be patentable for this reason alone, notwithstanding that such claims may very well have some form of practical application, e.g. new tactics employed in football or new ways of investing money. Exercising control over accepted human behaviour is tantamount to having exclusive rights for a surgical procedure that instructs a surgeon about how to remove your appendix safely. The courts are not going to permit this level of control.
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Notice: This practice note reflects the current opinion of Hepworth Browne and is distributed to selected associates and friends with a view to outline opportunities and to promote or highlight effective prosecution regimes before, particularly, the EPO. The views expressed herein may change with time and should not be considered as legally binding. Should specific questions or issues arise, Hepworth Browne recommends that, prior to the undertaking of any course of legal action whatsoever, specific professional advice be obtained by the reader from a competent and qualified advisor. In this latter respect, Hepworth Browne remains at the reader’s assistance. For specific questions and further information, please refer any query to Bruce C. Dearling (Partner: Software, Telecommunications and Business Systems) at bcd@hepworthbrowne.com.
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Hepworth Browne – Different by Design
© Hepworth Browne 2014
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References
Neutral Citation Number: [2006] EWCA Civ 1371 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/1371.html 2 http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar_case?case=4678936614949330705&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi =scholarr&sa=X&ei=rzNjVOnaLcfIsATAqYDACg&sqi=2&ved=0CB8QgAMoADAA 3 https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/409/63/case.html https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/561/08-964/opinion.html 5 http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t101769eu1.html#q= https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/13-298/concur4.html 7 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf 8 http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2013/e/index.html http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/consolidated_laws.pdf http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/DC6171F182D8B65AC125772100426656/$Fil e/G3_08_Opinion_12_05_2010_en.pdf 11 http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t090533fu1.html#q= http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t840208ep1.html#q= 13 http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t971173ex1.html#q= http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t040154ex1.html#q= 15 http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t000641ex1.html#q= https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/566/10-1150/opinion3.html 17 https://casetext.com/case/application-of-chatfield http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t091539du1.html#q= 19 https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/306/86/case.html http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t050471eu1.html#q= 21 http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t061543eu1.html#q= http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t030258ex1.html#q= 23 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2106.html https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/437/584/case.html 25 https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/333/127/
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http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t071051eu1.html#q= 27 https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/450/175/case.html http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/1463.html http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t950931ep1.html#q= http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t970027fu1.html#q= http://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/full/2014/2014fcafc0150 http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf
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Hepworth Browne – Different by Design
© Hepworth Browne 2014
Practice Note (untitled source file)
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PRACTICE NOTE
The “As Such” Exclusions – Case Law, Practical Tests & Recommendations
Introduction
We have previously commented on the legal perspectives of, and attempted reconciliation between, the European Patent Office (EPO) and UK Intellectual Property Office (UK IPO) with respect to the “as such” exclusions to patentability under ostensibly Art. 52(2) & Art. 52(3) EPC. The following practice note provides: Section I: a summary of the principal case law in Europe and the UK; Section II: an update on recent developments, including signposts toward what might amount to a “technical contribution” Section III: observations & practical recommendations (based on experience) on how to mitigate the possibility of negative European decisions.
In the 6-months since the Symbian Limited vs. Comptroller decision [2008 EWCA Civ 1066 Case No. A3/2008/0950], there has been a noticeable change in outlook from UK Examiners and another UK decision AT&T Knowledge Ventures/CVON [2009 EWHC 343 (Pat)] that confirms our earlier recommendations on approach.
The Legislation
Art. 52(1) EPC: European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve and inventive step and are susceptible to industrial application. Art. 52(2) EPC: The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1:
a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
b) aesthetic creations;
c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers;
d) presentation of information. Art. 52(3) EPC: Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject matter or activities referred to therein only to the extent to which a European patent application or European patent relates to such subject matter or activities as such. [emphasis added]
Interestingly, no single decision satisfactorily deals with the “technical” nature of patentable inventions. Indeed, in looking at the statute reproduced above, no reference exists in Art. 52(2) EPC to any “technical” requirement or test. This has caused the UK judiciary (at least) to state that “The stipulation of a requirement for a technical contribution can lead to a potentially dangerous exercise of asking whether an application satisfies that stipulation rather than whether it satisfies the statutory requirement itself”.
However, technical contribution remains the acid test (per T208/84-Vicom), so where exactly does this leave us?
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Section I: Principal Case Law
The following summaries represent what we currently assess to be the salient issues raised in some of the principal decisions. The list of cases is not exhaustive and only intended to raise awareness to some seemingly important issues relevant to procurement/prosecution. In making legal arguments in specific cases, these summaries might therefore provide a starting point, but they are not meant as a substitute for considered legal research and detailed understanding.
1. G01/04 – Diagnostic Methods
According to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA), the correct approach is to “take a narrow view on what is excluded, placing emphasis on the legislature’s deliberate use of the words “as such”.
2. T208/84 – Vicom
A “technical contribution” was achieved from an enhanced picture that came about from a substantial increase in processing speed. It was not the enhanced image in Vicom that brought the case outside the exclusion of Art. 52(2) EPC, but rather the way the enhanced image was produced.
The decision established a global approach to “invention”, namely “Decisive is what technical contribution the invention as defined in the claims when considered as a whole makes to the known art”. Furthermore, it would be “inappropriate” to make a distinction between embodiments of the same invention carried out in hardware or in software because “an invention which would be patentable in accordance with conventional patentability criteria should not be excluded from protection by the mere fact that for its implementation modern technical means in the form of a computer program are used”.
3. T0154/04 – Duns Application
Art. 52(2) EPC does not exclude from patentability any subject matter or activity having a technical character even if it is related to the items [programs for computers, business methods, etc.] listed in the provision since these items are only excluded “as such”.
The four requirements for invention, novelty, inventive step and susceptibility to industrial application are essentially separate and independent criteria of patentability.
And, the claim must be construed to determine the technical features of the invention, i.e. those features which contribute to the technical character of the invention.
That said, in a claim it is legitimate to have a mix of technical and “non-technical” features and in which these non-technical features may actually form a dominating part of the claimed subject matter. However, non-technical features, to the extent that they do not interact with the technical subject matter for solving a technical problem, i.e. non-technical features “as such”, do not provide a technical contribution to the prior art and are thus to be ignored in assessing novelty and inventive step.
And in relation to the problem-solution approach… the problem must be a technical problem which the skilled person in the particular technical field might be asked to solve at the relevant priority date. The technical problem may therefore “be formulated using an aim to be achieved in a non-technical field, and which is thus not part of the technical contribution provided by the invention to the prior art”.
4. T1543/06 Gameaccount
In a similar fashion to Duns Application, this case related to a mixed technical/non-technical invention. The case failed because the Board was unable to identify any effects other than those inherent in the game rules themselves or those connected to carrying out functions by a computer with a processor and
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display and no identifiable synergistic effect between the game rules and technical implementation could be identified.
However, this decision confirmed that the mere technical implementation of excluded subject matter per se cannot form the basis of inventive step, i.e. it is necessary to ask how the per se subject matter (e.g. a game or business method) is implemented. Additionally, a consideration of the particular manner of implementation must focus on any further technical advantages or effects associated with the specific features of implementation over and above the effects and advantages inherent in the excluded subject- matter. Gameaccount therefore follows from the earlier decision T1173/97.
5. T1173/97 – IBM “Computer Program Product”
Established that computer program claims are allowable…”if the program has the potential to bring about, when running on a computer, a further technical effect which goes beyond the normal physical interactions between the program and the computer”.
6. T258/03 – Hitachi
This case related to the automation of the non-technical activity of performing a “Dutch” auction in the absence of bidders whereby a server (implementing the method) applied a business scheme (amounting to rules of an auction) and performed any necessary calculations.
The decision provided a definition of what amounts to an “invention” under Art. 52(1) EPC, i.e. “subject matter having technical character” that can be inferred from the physical features of an entity or the nature of an activity or could be conferred on a non-technical activity by the use of technical means.
From the perspective of inventive step, T258/03-Hitachi confirmed that an invention which as a whole falls outside the exclusion zone of Art. 52(2) EPC (i.e. is technical in character) cannot rely on excluded subject matter alone, even if that non-technical matter is novel and non-obvious, i.e. “Method steps consisting of modifications to a business scheme and aimed at circumventing a technical problem rather than solving it by technical means cannot contribute to the technical character of the subject matter”.
7. T125/01
In T125/01, a pure software enhancement (with no changes to the physical hardware) constituted an invention because the software made a technical contribution.
8. T163/85
Coded information was held capable of conferring a technical character on the information itself because it reflected the properties of the technical system by virtue of its formatting and/or processing. In this case, the television signal was not an abstract entity, but a physical reality and could be detected.
9. T833/91
In T833/91 it was held that the mere act of programming by itself could not take a computer implementation outside the “as such” exclusion because programming per se merely involves the presentation or ordering of information and/or the performance of a mental act.
10. T641/00-Comvik. T641/00-Comvik is presently cited in the Guidelines for Examination for the EPO (probably solely for the reason that it was a decision that was handed down by a member of the Board of Appeal involved in re-writing the related section of those guidelines. More particularly, the claims in T641/00-Comvik were directed towards nothing more than financial management of a cellular phone device based on its access to two different SIMs with two
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different identifies. The claims can therefore be considered to be representative of some form of financial behavioural control. Comvik therefore appears limited in its applicability and further appears to be quite case specific, but is frequently cited by the EPO.
11. Aerotel/Macrossan [2007, RPC 7]
This English Court of Appeal decision is whole-heartedly disliked by the EPO (see Leaman Browne
Practice Note: PATENTABILITY OF PROGAMS FOR COMPUTERS: Extent of the “As Such”
Exclusion following UK Court of Appeal Decision in Symbian) because any reference to the prior art in the context of Art. 52(2) and (3) EPC would lead to “insurmountable difficulties”. However, we make reference to this decision in this summary because the Technical Board of Appeal further qualifies the correct approach to assessing invention by stating that a good faith interpretation of the European Patent Convention means that “the technical effect approach (with the rider)” applied in Aerotel/Macrossan is irreconcilable with the EPC for the further reason that it presupposes that novel and inventive purely excluded matter does not count as a ‘technical contribution'”
12. Symbian Limited vs. Comptroller decision [2008 EWCA Civ 1066 Case No. A3/2008/0950]
This case shifted the UK position back towards the “global approach” to invention as established in T208/84-Vicom, but also suggested that the Aerotel/Macrossan decision was not an aberration but consistent with the case law of EPO case law. Significantly, ¶56 of the Symbian decision re-aligns the EPO and law in the UK because “when a computer with a new program operates better than a similar prior art computer, “to say, “oh but that is only because it is a better program – the computer itself is unchanged” gives no credit to the practical reality of what is achieved by the program. As a matter of such reality there is more than just a “better program”, there is a faster and more reliable computer”.
13. The EBA Referral in G03/2008
This referral can, by and large, be ignored. Essentially, commentary from within the EPO and UK IPO confirms our earlier position that the referral will maintain the status quo because (1) it asks the wrong questions (2) in a leading way that will (3) lead in inevitable answers that (4) provide no additional clarity on the significant issues of:
i) If computer programs fall within a field of technology for which patents can be granted, at what point does an invention, implemented as a computer program, acquire a technical contribution sufficient to take it beyond the “as such” exclusion of Art. 52(2) & (3) EPC? And
ii) How, if at all, does this answer change in relation to any mixed invention that combines technical features with interacting, non-technical features?
Section II: “What amounts to a Technical Contribution” – Useful Signposts from AT&T/CVON
In CVON, the venerable English High Court judge suggested that there are essentially 5 ways of considering whether the claimed subject matter possesses the requisite “technical effect”, but also qualified his comments (thereby reconciling the UK and EPO positions) by saying that it was then still necessary to consider whether such a claimed technical effect (i.e. the EPO’s technical contribution) lay solely in the excluded subject matter of Art. 52(2) EPC.
The suggested approach (which we view as useful) is to consider:
1. Whether the claimed technical effect has a technical effect on a process which is carried on outside of the computer? [Commentary: this appears to touch on aspects of the recent machine- or-transformation test in the decision of the US Federal Circuit in Bilski]
2. Whether the claimed technical effect operates at the level of the architecture of the computer, i.e. whether the effect is produced irrespective of the data being processed or the application being run? [Commentary: this seemingly reflects the IBM decisions T0115/85, T06/83 & T22/85 as referenced in Gale’s application [1991[ R.P.C. 305].
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3. Whether the claimed technical effect results in the computer being made to operate in a new way? [Commentary: this seems to equate to the position in T1173/97-IBM]
4. Whether there is an increase in speed or reliability of the computer. [Commentary: per Symbian].
5. Whether the perceived problem is overcome by the claimed invention as opposed to merely being circumvented. [Commentary: per T258/03-Hitachi]
[As a light aside, the judge’s approach contrasts with the tongue-in-cheek advice once offered to a junior UK IPO Examiner who inquired about the nature of “technical contribution”… the witty reply from a senior colleague was: “It’s like an elephant, you’ll recognize it when you see one”].
Section III: Observations, Conclusions and Recommendations
The definition of the technical problem remains difficult if the actual novel and creative concept making up the core of the claimed invention resides in the realm outside any technological field as it is frequently the case with computer implemented inventions (and similar “as such” subject matter). It is therefore necessary to reflect on the real technical contribution provided to the prior art. Unfortunately, G03/08 isn’t going to help. Indeed, the handling of interactions between technical and non-technical features is seemingly not well understood by the EPO’s Examining Division and it is therefore a critical success factor to have the position adequately developed in written arguments (for reasons of possible appeal). The lack of clear and general guidance for the EPO’s examining divisions means that it is absolutely necessary to question and expose each any every “leap of faith” that these examiners suggest in assessing inventive step of potentially “non-technical” subject matter.
• In trying to define the “technical contribution of the invention” (per Viacom), it seems appropriate to argue that such a contribution provides, in ‘practical reality’, something that works better by virtue of the invention.
• In framing the detailed description, it is necessary to bear in mind the international nature of the application and the differing standards/tests for both inventive step and excluded subject matter: o Avoid using language that directly reads onto the European exclusions.
• UK Courts have been keen to latch onto statements that suggest ethical considerations and seemingly to exercise moral prejudice (however wrong) in their reasoning. o Emphasize the functional effect(s) and practical reality achieved by the invention. o Don’t obscure the invention, but be clear while mindful to cover the various aspects and embodiments of the invention.
• In Conor Medsystems vs. Angiotech [2008] UKHL 49, senior Law Lords were extremely critical when they stated that “the inventors and those who drafted the specification have to some extent brought the tribulations of this litigation upon themselves”. o Avoid inappropriate use of the word “may” that makes the embodiments appear too tenuous. Internal commentary from within the UK IPO is “say what you see and mean what you say”. o Avoid contrasting any advantages attributable to the invention as corresponding to business transactions, e.g. credit card transactions. o Think laterally to turn commercial advantages achieved by the claimed invention into technical solutions that have an underlying technical problem.
• For example, the inventor’s idea is to alert a gambler to the existence and location of a gaming machine (in a casino) perceived by the player to be either “hot” or “cold” that therefore ripe for payout. The inventor’s idea might therefore be interpreted by the Examiner as seeking to generate greater cash revenue by encouraging the commencement of gambling in the shortest time frame. To place a technical slant on this objective, the specification might instead be framed to describe the technical contribution as being embodied in either:
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▪ i) a system of managing the playing of gaming machines across a network, the system operatively based on user selected criteria and the re-direction of that user based on their individually selected criteria; or ▪ ii) a system controller that determines game machine usage and which operates to distribute usage of machines [across the casino] by generating and displaying location identities of gaming machines that fall into each of a plurality of user- identified categories. By framing the inventor’s idea in terms of the technical impact on either the system (as a whole) or on the system controller, points (i) and (ii) deflect the Examiner’s attention away from potentially objectionable “non-technical” business aspects. o Provide a mix of interacting technical and non-technical features, rather than an aggregation of unrelated features (see T37/82, T285/91 and T294/89). o UK IPO Examiners have also recently indicated that the 4-stage Aerotel/Macrossan test can seemingly be overcome with reference to the specific technical operation of the system because the specifics often reflect the underlying technical contribution. o Avoid Bilski-esque objections of “insignificant post-solution activity” by expressly augmenting the specification with statements concerning real-world (“practical reality”) technical advantages. o Frame the introductory portion of the specification to set out some form of technical problem or at least the disadvantages experienced in the prior art. Without some form of pointed discussion, the EPO (particularly) will often try to suggest that the invention has no technical benefit and that features can be isolated using the “contribution approach”. Whilst there is a cost to the client, both in terms of drafting time and potential acknowledgement of prior art, the risk of not adequately setting out a secondary technical solution or an underlying technical problem is likely to be worse, i.e. rejection of the invention as a “non invention” under Art.52(2) EPC.
In many respects, the recent Federal Circuit decision in Bilski has brought the US position on claims directed towards non-patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101 closer to the EPO approach. At the same time and in a complementary sense, the overly-aggressive reaction in the UK (following Aerotel/Macrossan) has been tempered by Symbian (and followed in CVON) to seemingly endorse a common international position on, at least, the patentability of business method patentability. Whether the current legal position will stifle the appropriate reward for ingenuity and curtail investment in innovation is a discussion for another day.
Both the EPO and European national courts get decisions wrong and strong advocacy skills (and a willingness to question and expose frailty) are critical in building a successful team that can acquire appropriate rights.
In summary, prosecution of cases before the EPO that involve some form of financial management or human behavioural control (or fail to highlight a practical application for the concept) are likely to face severe problems. In general, there is a strong push to have applications provide and describe some form of synergy or secondary technical effect, since these aspects can be used as leverage against cases such as Hitachi. Moreover, there is preponderance for EPO examining divisions in the field to apply the so- called “contribution approach” that appeared in T931/95-Pension Benefit to isolate features in the claims and to exclude those features from consideration under Art.56 EPC – inventive step. Such a form of feature isolation therefore operates against a supportable argument of technical interaction that would otherwise provide an overall (secondary) technical effect or some additional synergy, as indicated by both T1173/07-Computer Program Products and T0154/04-Duns Licensing.
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Notice: This practice note reflects the current opinion of Leaman Browne and is distributed to selected associates and friends with a view to outline opportunities and to promote or highlight effective prosecution regimes before the UK IPO & the EPO. The views expressed herein may change with time and should not be considered as legally binding. Should specific questions or issues arise, Leaman Browne recommends that, prior to the undertaking of any course of legal action whatsoever, specific professional advice be obtained by the reader from a competent and qualified advisor. In this latter respect, Leaman Browne remains at the reader’s assistance. For specific questions, please refer to any query to Bruce C. Dearling at bcd@hepworthbrowne.com.
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